Washington refinery fire 2017

Aldridge, 50, of Anacortes, according to the Skagit County coroner. A year-old woman died of her burns at the hospital; she was identified as Kathryn Powell of Burlington. Tesoro identified the fifth victim as year-old Donna Van Dreumel, employed at the plant since The Oak Harbor woman died Friday night at Harborview. The blast occurred in a unit that was in the dangerous process of returning to operation, turning up heat and pressure, said Tesoro spokesman Greg Wright.

Michael Silverstein, an assistant director at the state labor department, described the explosion and fire as occurring in a bank of boilers.

In November, the state reached a settlement with Tesoro, requiring in part that the company correct the hazards and hire a third-party consultant to do a safety audit. Jeff Haffner, associate general counsel for Tesoro, said the third-party audit was completed in the past few weeks, but the consulting firm hired had not yet issued its report.

The state inspections were part of a national effort to examine all petroleum refineries in the United States after the explosion in Texas. Of the 18 major accidents the U. Yet there are only refineries in the country and tens of thousands of other chemical plants. Tesoro is an independent refiner and marketer of petroleum products. The Anacortes refinery, which Tesoro has owned since , can refine about , barrels of crude daily, according to the company.

It mainly processes Alaska North Slope crude and makes gasoline, diesel and jet fuel, mostly for Washington and Oregon. The company that owns the refinery, the Tesoro Corp. A fourth person, a year-old woman, died from her injuries at Harborview Medical Center in Seattle, Washington, said medical center spokeswoman Susan Gregg-Hanson.

Three others -- a year-old woman, a year-old man and a year-old man -- remain in critical condition at the medical center with major burns, Gregg-Hanson said. The fire at the Anacortes, Washington, refinery occurred shortly after midnight at the naphtha unit of the refinery while maintenance work was being performed, the Tesoro Corp. The fire was contained around 2 a. Friday and affected units have been shut down, Tesoro said on its Web site.

Require verification of actual operating conditions to determine potential equipment damage mechanisms. Revise the Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions under 40 CFR Part 68 to require the documented use of inherently safer systems analysis and the hierarchy of controls to the greatest extent feasible when facilities are establishing safeguards for identified process hazards.

The goal shall be to reduce the risk of major accidents to the greatest extent practicable, to be interpreted as equivalent to as low as reasonably practicable ALARP. Include requirements for inherently safer systems analysis to be automatically triggered for all management of change, incident investigation, and process hazard analysis reviews and recommendations, prior to the construction of a new process, process unit rebuilds, significant process repairs, and in the development of corrective actions.

Effectively participate in the Tesoro Anacortes Refinery process safety culture survey oversight committee as recommended under recommendation I-WA-R Incorporate the expertise of process safety culture experts in the development and interpretation of the safety culture surveys.

Ensure the effective participation of the workforce and their representatives in the development of the surveys and the implementation of corrective actions. Based on the findings in this report, augment your existing process safety management regulations for petroleum refineries in the state of Washington with the following more rigorous goal-setting attributes:. Systematic analysis and documentation of all major hazards and safeguards, using the hierarchy of controls to reduce those risks to as low as reasonably practicable ALARP ;.

Documentation of the recognized methodologies,rationale and conclusions used to claim that safeguards intended to control hazards will be effective;.

Documented damage mechanism hazard review conducted by a diverse team of qualified personnel. This review shall be an integral part of the Process Hazard Analysis cycle and shall be conducted on all PSM-covered process piping circuits and process equipment.

The damage mechanism hazard review shall identify potential process damage mechanisms and consequences of failure, and shall ensure effective safeguards are in place to control hazards presented by those damage mechanisms. Require the analysis and incorporation of applicable industry best practices and inherently safer design to the greatest extent feasible into this review; and.

Documented use of inherently safer systems analysis and the hierarchy of controls to the greatest extent feasible in establishing safeguards for identified process hazards.

Include requirements for inherently safer systems analysis to be automatically triggered for all Management of Change and Process Hazard Analysis reviews, prior to the construction of new processes, process unit rebuilds, significant process repairs, and in the development of corrective actions from incident investigation recommendations. A thorough review of the comprehensive process hazard analysis by technically competent regulatory personnel;.

Require that all safety codes, standards, employer internal procedures and recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices RAGAGEP used in the implementation of the regulations contain adequate minimum requirements;. Require an increased role for workers in management of process safety by establishing the rights and responsibilities of workers and their representatives on health and safety-related matters, and the election of safety representatives and establishment of safety committees with equal representation between management and labor to serve health and safety-related functions.

The elected representatives should have a legally recognized role that goes beyond consultation in activities such as the development of the comprehensive process hazard analysis, management of change, incident investigation, audits, and identification and effective control of hazards.

The representatives should also have the authority to stop work that is perceived to be unsafe or that presents a serious hazard until the regulator intervenes to resolve the safety concern. Work force participation practices should be documented by the company to the regulator; and. Requires reporting of information to the public to the greatest extent feasible such as a summary of the comprehensive process hazard analysis which includes a list of safeguards implemented and standards utilized to reduce risk, and process safety indicators that demonstrate the effectiveness of the safeguards and management systems.

Establish a well-funded, well-staffed, technically qualified regulator with a compensation system to ensure the Washington Department of Labor and Industries regulator has the ability to attract and retain a sufficient number of employees with the necessary skills and experience to ensure regulator technical qualifications.

Periodically conduct a market analysis and benchmarking review to ensure the compensation system remains competitive with Washington petroleum refineries. Work with the regulator, the petroleum refining industry, labor, and other relevant stakeholders in the state of Washington to develop and implement a system that collects, tracks, and analyzes process safety leading and lagging indicators from operators and contractors to promote continuous process safety improvements.

At a minimum, this program shall:. Require the use of leading and lagging process safety indicators to actively monitor the effectiveness of process safety management systems and safeguards for major accident prevention. Include leading and lagging indicators that are measureable, actionable, and standardized.